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HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODELLING FOR ACCIDENT RISK ASSESSMENT
 OF ACTIVE RUNWAY CROSSING OPERATION
Sybert H. Stroeve, Henk A.P. Blom
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
A human performance modelling approach is presented for risk assessment of operations with multiple, dynamically
interacting agents. The approach is illustrated for a risk model of runway incursion on an active departure runway.
This model-based approach can provide detailed, systematically derived results on risk contributions of human
operators and technical systems in complex multi-agent environments.
Introduction
Since capacity and efficiency are the drivers of the
development of advanced air traffic operations, by
now there is a broad consensus that appropriate
accident risk assessment models are needed to assess
safety in relation to capacity with the aim to optimise
advanced air traffic operations (Wickens et al., 1998).
Air traffic operations account for highly distributed
and dynamic interactions between human operators,
procedures and technical systems. As such, the safety
of air traffic operations depends not only on the
functioning of the individual elements in such multi-
agent scenarios, but also on their complex interactions,
especially in non-nominal situations. Because of this
distributed control nature of air traffic, established
techniques fall short in performing accident risk
assessment. Blom et al. (2001) addressed this problem
by development of a Monte Carlo simulation-based
methodology that takes an integral approach towards
human performance modelling and accident risk
assessment for air traffic (Traffic Organization and
Perturbation AnalyZer: TOPAZ).
The human performance modelling approach
followed in TOPAZ is based on a contextual
perspective in which human actions are the product
of human internal states, strategies and the
environment (Amalberti and Wioland, 1997;
Hollnagel, 1993; Wickens and Holland, 1999;
Cacciabue, 1998). The model for task performance of
a human operator considers multiple tasks, human
error and contextual control modes (Blom et al.,
2003). Specifically, for a human operator
• a decomposition of the tasks of the human
operator is identified,
• the most essential cognitive control modes are
identified,
• the characteristics of the operator tasks are
identified for the most important cognitive control
modes,
• clusters of tasks are identified,
• hierarchy and concurrency for the task clusters
are identified.
In such performance modelling, parameter values are
based on operational observation, real-time
simulation and expert interviews. Corker et al. (2005)
showed that an additional way of identifying
parameter values is to make use of the more detailed
human performance model of Air-MIDAS.
In air traffic, situation awareness problems are
important contributing factors to many accidents. The
concept of situation awareness addresses perception
of elements in the environment, their interpretation
and the projection of the future status (Endsley,
1995). In an air traffic environment with multiple
human operators, these aspects and associated errors
of situation awareness depend on human-human and
human-machine interactions. A model for situation
awareness evolution in a multi-agent air traffic
environment was developed (Stroeve et al., 2003;
Blom and Stroeve, 2004). Here, an agent is an entity,
such as a human operator or a technical system,
which may have situation awareness of its
environment. The environment of an agent includes
the complete group of agents. The situation
awareness of each agent consists of time-dependent
information of other agents, including identity,
continuous state variables, mode variables and intent
variables. Achieving, acquiring and maintaining
situation awareness depends on processes as
observation, communication and reasoning.
It  is  the  goal  of  the  current  paper  to  elucidate  the
approach for multi-agent human performance
modelling and illustrate it for simulation-based
accident risk assessment of an active runway crossing
operation. In the sequel of this paper, the risk
assessment steps and the runway operation are
described first, followed by methods and results of
the simulation model with emphasis on human
performance aspects.
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Accident Risk Assessment Steps
Following the TOPAZ methodology, assessment of
the risk of an operation is performed in a number of
steps:
1. Determine the scope: In collaboration with
operational experts, determine the scope of the
operation. Determine safety criteria and methods
of the risk assessment.
2. Description of the operation: Describe in
sufficient detail the operation, including context,
human roles and responsibilities, procedures and
technical systems.
3. Hazard identification: Identify non-nominal
events or situations possibly having adverse
effects on the operation. Particularly of interest
are brainstorm results on situations and events
for which pilots and controllers have
complementary opinions.
4. Construction of conflict scenarios: Hazards are
related to conflict types and ordered with respect
to time and cause and effect. The resulting
hazard structures are called conflict scenarios.
Risk is divided into sub-risks related to the
various conflict types. This enables efficient and
orderly evaluation of risk.
5. Argumentation-based evaluation: Evaluate the
risk based on the conflict scenarios, interviews
with operational experts (pilots, controllers) and
incident databases. This provides a first
indication of the severity and frequency of
conflict scenarios.
6. Development of a simulation model: Develop a
mathematical accident risk model for conflict
scenarios that are difficult to assess by
argumentation-based evaluation. This stochastic
dynamic model represents the performance and
interaction of technical systems and human
performance for a particular air traffic situation.
7. Simulation-based evaluation: Evaluate
potentially safety-critical and uncertain risks by
Monte Carlo simulations based on the developed
simulation model and hierarchical simulation
speed-up techniques.
8. Evaluation of model assumptions: Assess the
effect on the modelled risk of assumptions made
in the modelling process. This step accounts for
the recognition that a model differs by definition
from reality. It includes an analysis of bias and
uncertainty in assumptions as well as a risk
sensitivity analysis, and results in an evaluation
of bias and uncertainty bounds of the risk of the
operation.
9. Risk criteria: Compare the evaluated risk with
risk criteria to assist decision-makers in their
evaluation of the acceptability of the operation.
Here, operational experts are actively involved during
hazard identification, argumentation-based evaluation
and evaluation of model assumptions.
Active Runway Crossing Operation
The active runway crossing operation enables traffic
to cross an active departure runway (named Runway
A) in order to taxi between the aprons and a second
runway (named Runway B). Each crossing has
remotely controlled stopbars on both sides of the
runway. The operation includes a large number of
interacting agents (see also Figure 1):
• aircraft (taking off or taxiing),
• aircraft’s flight management systems (FMS),
• pilots flying (PF’s),
• pilots not flying (PNF’s),
• Runway A controller,
• Runway B controller,
• ground controller,
• departure controller,
• start-up controller,
• ATC system, which is broadly defined to include
- airport manoeuvre control systems,
- surveillance systems,
- airport configuration,
- environmental conditions,
- communication systems.
Figure 1. Relations between agents identified for the
active runway crossing operation.
In the operation, communication between controllers
and aircraft crews is via standard R/T. Monitoring by
the controllers is via direct visual observation and is
supported by radar track plots. The runway crossing
operation over Runway A is under the responsibility
of  the  Runway  A  controller.  The  Runway  A
controller is supported by a runway incursion alert
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system and a stopbar violation alert system. The
Runway A controller manages the remotely
controlled stopbars and the runway lighting.
Monitoring by the aircraft crews is by visual
observation and may be supported by the VHF R/T
party-line effect.
Simulation Model
An initial argumentation-based evaluation of the risk
of  the  active  runway crossing  operation  showed that
of all identified conflict scenarios, there are three
conflict scenarios that may pose unacceptable safety
effects. In this paper, we focus on the details of an
accident risk model for one of these conflict
scenarios. In this conflict scenario there is one
aircraft  that  takes  off  and has  been allowed to  do  so
and there is one aircraft that crosses the runway while
it should not. Taxiing along a straight line over a
standard runway crossing is considered. Hence, in the
illustrative example of this paper, emphasis is placed
on the models of the aircraft, pilot flying, Runway A
controller and ATC system agents. A high-level
overview of these models is specified next.
Aircraft A taking-off aircraft initiates take-off from a
position at the beginning of the runway. A crossing
aircraft initiates crossing at a position close to the
remotely controlled stopbar with a normal taxiing
speed or from a hold state.
Pilot Flying of Taking Off Aircraft Initially, the pilot
flying (PF) of a taking off aircraft has the SA that take-
off is allowed and initiates a take-off. During the take-
off the PF monitors the traffic situation on the runway
visually and via the VHF communication channel. The
PF  starts  a  collision  avoidance  braking  action  if  a
crossing aircraft is observed within a critical distance
from the runway centre-line or in reaction to an ATCo
clearance, and it is decided that braking will stop the
aircraft in front of the crossing aircraft.
Pilot Flying of Crossing Aircraft Initially, the PF has
the intent SA that the next airport way-point is either
a regular taxiway or a runway crossing. In the former
case the PF proceeds taxiing and in the latter case the
PF  may  have  the  SA  that  crossing  is  allowed.  The
characteristics of the visual monitoring process of the
PF depend on the intent SA. In case of awareness of a
conflict, either due to own visual observation or due
to an ATCo call, the PF stops the aircraft, unless it is
already within a critical distance from the runway
centre-line.
Runway Controller The Runway A controller
visually monitors the traffic and has support from a
stopbar violation alert and a runway incursion alert. If
the ATCo is aware that a crossing aircraft has passed
the stopbar, a hold clearance is specified to both the
crossing and the taking off aircraft.
ATC System The ATC system includes
communication systems, tracking systems, a stopbar
violation alert, a runway incursion alert and remotely
controlled stopbars.
Hazard Representation The model of the active
runway crossing procedure accounts for intent-
dependent and cognitive mode-dependent error-prone
perception processes of pilots flying and the Runway
A  controller.  Table  1  shows  how  a  number  of
situation awareness related hazards of the operation
considered were accounted for in the accident
risk model.
Table 1. Examples of the representation of hazards
in the accident risk model of the active runway
crossing procedure.
Hazard Model representation
Runway incursion alert is
active, but runway
controller has wrong
‘picture’ of the situation,
and therefore reacts too
late, not or wrongly.
In response to an alert
there is a chance that the
runway controller does
not observe the conflict
and therefore does not
react.
Pilots get confused
because of complexity of
the taxiways in the new
operation.
The PF of a taxiing
aircraft may be aware that
the aircraft is taxiing on a
regular taxiway while it
actually is on a runway
crossing.
Pilot reacts not, wrongly,
too late or cannot react to
conflict solving clearance
of runway controller.
There is a chance that the
PF does not or only after
a long time becomes
aware of a clearance.
Performance Model of Pilot Flying
The various human performance submodels are
integrated into a simulation model. As an illustrative
example, a model is presented of the pilot flying of
an aircraft that taxies towards the runway crossing. A
high-level overview of the model elements of the
pilot flying agent is shown in
Figure 2. The human operator model includes the
following groups of model elements.
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Figure 2. High-level overview of the model elements
of the pilot flying agent.
Task Triggering Task triggering processes specify
times at which it is desired to complete a task. They
may depend on other processes, such as task
performance and situation awareness. For example,
the model blocks Monitoring Generator and
Coordination Generator in
Figure 2 represent task triggering processes of a pilot
flying and specify times at which monitoring of the
traffic situation and coordination with the pilot not
flying is desired, respectively. These model blocks
receive several inputs. For instance, the dependence
of  Monitoring  Generator  from  Intent  SA  enables  an
intent-dependent visual updating frequency.
Task Scheduling Task scheduling processes
determine which tasks should currently be processed
by the human operator. Task scheduling processes
may depend on other processes, e.g., task triggering,
task performance and situation awareness processes.
For example, in
Figure 2 the Task Scheduling block represents a
scheduling process with a fixed hierarchy and
concurrency structure.
Task Performance Task performance processes
describe the development of the progress of a task.
They may, e.g., depend on task scheduling and
cognitive mode processes. For example, in
Figure 2  Task Performance depends on Cognitive
Mode, resulting in a faster task performance in the
opportunistic control mode with respect to the tactical
control mode of the pilot flying.
Cognitive Control Mode Cognitive control mode
processes describe the cognitive control mode of the
human operator. They may, e.g., depend on the
number and types of scheduled tasks. See, for
instance, the Cognitive Mode block in
Figure 2.
Situation Awareness Situation awareness model
elements represent the state SA and intent SA, as
outlined before. In
Figure 2, the model blocks State SA, Intent SA and
Conflict Detection represent SA components, where
the latter block represents the detection process and
the SA of a conflict. In
Figure 2, State SA depends Cognitive Mode,
representing that (errors in) the state SA updating
process can depend on the cognitive mode.
Task Specific Actions Task specific actions represent
particular elements of tasks of a human operator. For
instance, for a pilot flying these may include (see
Figure 2) Crossing Actions, Takeoff Actions,
Runway Taxiing Actions, Taxiway Taxiing Actions
and Conflict Actions.
Hierarchical Monte Carlo Simulations
An accident risk assessment includes a risk
decomposition, which supports efficient evaluation of
the collision risk and promotes insight in the risk
contributions. The evaluation of the collision risk is
based on the probabilities and the conditional
collision risks of combinations of event sequences, as
have been identified in the decomposition process.
The decomposition process considers whether alert
systems, remotely controlled stopbar and
communication systems are functioning well or not.
The decomposition process considered in the
example includes
• the aircraft type of each aircraft to be either a
medium-weight A320 or a heavy-weight B747;
• the  intent  SA  of  the  PF  of  a  crossing  aircraft
concerning the next way-point (Taxiway /
Crossing) and concerning allowance of runway
crossing (Allowed / Not Allowed);
• whether alert systems are functioning well or
not;
• whether the remotely controlled stopbar is
functioning well or not;
• whether communication systems are functioning
well or not.
Based on the simulation model and the accident risk
decomposition, Monte Carlo simulation software is
developed to evaluate the conditional collision risk for
the events resulting form the decomposition process.
Accident Risk Results of the Model
This section presents results of the simulation-based
risk evaluation for a generic runway in good visibility
conditions. Figure 3 shows the accident risk as
function of the distance of the runway crossing with
respect to the runway threshold. The probability of a
728
collision decreases for larger crossing distances.
Figure 3 also shows the decomposition of the total
risk for the cases that the pilot flying of the taxiing
aircraft either intends to proceed on a normal taxiway
(without  being  aware  to  be  heading  to  a  runway
crossing) or intends to cross the runway (without
being aware that crossing is currently not allowed).
The largest contribution to the risk is from the
situation that the pilot intends to proceed on a normal
taxiway. The relative size of this contribution
depends on the crossing distance and varies from
64% for crossing at 500 m to about 83% for crossing
at 1000 m or 2000 m.
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Figure 3. Contributions to the total collision risk by
the simulation model for the cases that the SA of the
PF of the taxiing aircraft is to proceed on a taxiway,
or to cross the runway.
Table 2. SA Dependent collision risk by the
simulation model for crossing at a distance of 1000 m
(event condition is not distant dependent).
SA by PF of
 taxiing aircraft
Probability
per take-off
Proceed
taxiway
Cross
runway
Probability of event 3.5 10-5 2.0 10-4
Conditional coll. risk 1.7 10-4 5.5 10-6
Collision risk 6.0 10-9 1.1 10-9
The collision risk in Table 2 depends on the probability
of the particular SA condition and the probability of a
collision given this condition, for a crossing distance of
1000 metres. The probability of the situation that a pilot
taxies across the stopbar not knowing he is approaching
the  runway,  is  assumed to  be  a  factor  5.7  smaller  than
the probability of the situation that the pilot starts
crossing the runway while not allowed to do so.
Nevertheless, the largely enhanced conditional collision
risk leads to a larger collision risk in the former case.
The reduced conditional collision risk in the latter
situation is due to better monitoring process of the pilot
flying  of  the  taxiing  aircraft,  if  its  crew is  aware  to  be
heading towards a crossing of an active runway.
Based on results of the accident risk model, it is
possible to attain insight in the accident risk reducing
performance of involved human operators and
technical systems. Table 3 shows conditional
collision risks for the situation that an aircraft taxies
towards a runway crossing at a distance of 1000 m
from the runway threshold while the pilot is aware to
taxi on a normal taxiway. The conditional collision
risks in Table 3 refer to cases in which the involved
human operators either do (‘yes’) or do not (‘no’)
actively monitor for traffic conflicts. A risk reduction
percentage is determined by comparing the
conditional collision risk with the situation in which
none of the human operators is actively monitoring.
In this case, a collision is only avoided by the lucky
circumstances that the taxiing aircraft just passes in
front of or behind the taking-off aircraft (case 0 in
Table 3).
Table 3. Risk reduction achieved in the simulation
model by various combinations of involved human
operators for the situation that the pilot flying of the
taxiing aircraft intends to proceed on a normal
taxiway. See main text for further explanation.
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ATC alert systems on
1 yes yes yes 1.7 10-4 99.8%
2 yes no yes 4.0 10-4 99.6%
3 no yes yes 9.4 10-3 89.4%
4 yes yes no 2.3 10-4 99.7%
ATC alert systems down
5 yes yes yes 2.2 10-4 99.8%
6 yes no yes 1.7 10-3 98.1%
7 no yes yes 1.1 10-2 87.9%
8 yes yes no 2.3 10-4 99.7%
A number of model-based insights can be attained by
comparing the results of Table 3.
• It follows from case 1 that 99.8% of the accidents
can be prevented by the combined effort of all
human operators and alert systems.
• It follows from a comparison of cases 1 and 5 that
in the normal situation that all human operators
are actively monitoring, ATC alert systems
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(runway incursion or stopbar violation) almost
have no effect on the achieved risk.
• It follows from a comparison of cases 1 and 4,
and cases 5 and 8, that the risk reduction that can
be achieved by the tower controller in addition to
the risk reduction of both pilots is very small.
• It follows from comparison of cases 1 and 3, and
cases 5 and 7 that the pilot of the taxiing aircraft
has the largest capability to prevent a collision in
this context.
Discussion
The accident risk assessment methodology and the
associated human performance modelling approach
that are discussed in this paper, provide a systematic
approach to risk assessment of operations with
multiple, dynamically interacting agents. The
combined effect of dynamically interacting agents is
hard to assess by static or single-agent approaches.
As an example, during an argumentation-based risk
assessment of the discussed active runway crossing
operation, pilots and controllers were asked to
estimate their potential to prevent a collision as result
of a runway incursion. Especially the contribution of
the tower controller was overestimated, because this
expert-based evaluation had difficulty to account well
for the timing of actions of the pilots and controller.
Through Monte Carlo simulations it has become clear
that in good visibility conditions, a large part of
conflicts is recognised and handled by the pilots
before the controller can react.
By definition a model is unequal to reality. Hence,
application in a risk assessment of the discussed
models requires an evaluation of the effect on the risk
of the assumptions adopted in the modelling process
(Everdij and Blom, 2002). This evaluation takes into
account the particular context of the operation
assessed and will be conducted in a follow-up study.
Then interviews with pilots and controllers will be
conducted to obtain their feedback on the
assumptions made. In these interviews, typically
asked questions will refer to single-agent tasks and
aspects such as task duration. These kind of questions
can be more easily estimated than small probability
values (e.g., conflict resolution probability estimates
in a multi-agent environment) such as typically
included in interviews for argumentation-based
risk assessment.
The feasibility of using human performance
modelling in accident risk assessment for a conflict
scenario with a considerable number of interacting
humans and technical systems has been illustrated for
an active runway crossing operation. The model
results stress the importance of proper situation
awareness of the pilots flying for minimising runway
incursion risk.
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